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Abstract
With the aim of providing a preliminary forecast of the economic repercussion of the recent confinement,
we estimate a canonical medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) for the Euro Area
economy, augmented with financial frictions. Relying on such characterisation of the economy, we carry out a
series of simulations in which we use a shock to the labour supply as the primary conductor of the consequences
of this pandemic disturbance. Moreover, we assess the adequacy of quantitative easing policies that many central
banks are adopting as a measure to counterbalance the economic damage caused by COVID-19. We conclude
that these initiatives serve as an immediate response, but they are limited by central banks’ inflation target and
should be accompanied by other measures able to speed up the recovery in the medium and long run.
Keywords: DSGE model, Euro Area, COVID-19, recession, monetary policy, quantitative easing.
*I want to express my gratitude to my supervisors, Jesu´s Va´zquez Pe´rez and Luis Herrera Bravo, for the precious time that they have
devoted to this project and the patience they have shown when introducing new concepts and techniques that I was unfamiliar with. It
is thanks to their reflections and explanations that this work has become an exciting learning process, much beyond the mere master’s
thesis requirements. I also want to thank the rest of professors of the EAP master’s. Especially Javier Gardeazabal Mat´ıas, Cruz
A´ngel Echevarr´ıa Olave and Petr Mariel, whose inspiring remarks and interesting points of view have been really helpful to improve our
analysis. Additionally, I sincerely appreciate my classmates’ valuable suggestions and their interest, which has been truly encouraging.
Finally, my loved ones deserve a mention for their support, for which I will be always grateful.
1
1 Introduction
Unfortunately, 2020 will go down in history as the year of COVID-19 pandemic and social distancing due to
confinement. The first case was documented at the end of 2019 in Wuhan, China (Liu, Kuo, and Shih, 2020). By
the middle of February, while the rest of the world was still astonished with the strict measures that the Chinese
government was imposing, the virus had already spread to many other countries, including six in the Euro Area
(Spiteri et al., 2020). On March 9th and March 14th Italy and Spain, respectively, confined their population,
followed by most of their partners in the common market. Such a large-scale stop in our normal activity has
consequences that are still far from certain. In the following lines we try to shed some light on this topic, with focus
on the economic impact of confinement in the Euro Area. For this purpose we will estimate a medium-scale dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, following mainly the approach in Smets and Wouters (2007).
As pointed out by Becker, Hege, and Mella-Barral (2020), the coronavirus crisis has come in times of a private
sector considerably indebted, which had showed little improvements since the financial crisis of 2007-2008. The
authors highlight that the policies adopted will “ inevitably leave parts of the corporate sector with even larger
debt burdens” and therefore “ delay a recovery” (p. 37). Consequently, we augment the model by implementing an
endogenous financial sector to account for the important role that firms’ debt may have. In particular, we consider
the state-of-the-art model designed by Gelain and Ilbas (2017), which incorporates financial rigidities a` la Gertler
and Karadi (2011) in the DSGE model from Smets and Wouters (2007).
Some authors integrate a sanitary sector in macroeconomic models, allowing to explore the consequences of
different policies not only on economic variables but also on the number of contagions and deceased. Such modelling
is beyond the scope of this work, since our aim is to approximate the consequences of policies actually adopted
rather than contrasting which would have been the effects of other alternatives. However, there are interesting
contributions in that line of investigation. It is worthy to mention Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2020), in which the
authors assemble an Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model with an epidemiological SIR model. This
combination reveals some degree of trade-off between protecting more lives and minimising the economic damage.
This idea is also supported by Eichenbaum, Rebelo, and Trabandt (2020). At last, they provide an interesting, yet
preliminary, analysis of different policies seeking for describing the frontier of possibilities in this trade-off.
Initially, we estimate the model by Bayesian methods, making use of Dynare (Matlab) and with data for the Euro
Area until the last quarter of 2019. Once we have the estimated values of the model parameter that characterise
the Euro Area, we proceed with a series of simulations, focusing on a labour supply shock as the main conductor of
COVID-19 confinement consequences. It may be seen as a strong simplification, given that confinement has probably
generated disturbances of other natures. Remarkably, a demand shock associated to consumption and investment
(Wren-Lewis, 2020). Eichenbaum et al. (2020) asserts that “ these effects [from supply and demand sides] work
in tandem to generate a large, persistent recession”. However, according to Rio-Chanona, Mealy, Pichler, Lafond,
and Farmer’s (2020) comparison, the largest shocks would come from the supply side. Furthermore, Guerrieri,
Lorenzoni, Straub, and Werning (2020) show that demand deficiencies can originate in reductions in labour supply,
like the ones we emulate with the shock that we have chosen. They give the name of “ Keynesian supply shocks” to
those supply shocks whose impact on aggregate demand is larger than the shock itself. One of the requirements for
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this event to take place is that the fall in employment only affects some sectors. Other facilitators of this disturbance
shift are incomplete markets, liquidity constrained consumers and low substitutability across sectors. Fornaro and
Wolf (2020) elaborate more on this idea talking about a doom loop between supply and demand disturbances.
Goodhart and Pradhan (2020) also place labour supply as the main cause of the macroeconomic effects of the
pandemic. Finally, we find strong support for our approach in Mihailov (2020). This author considers the model
developed by Gal´ı, Smets, and Wouters (2012), relatively close to the one used in this analysis, and models the
pandemic disruption as a labour supply shock.
During the simulations, we assume different potential scenarios by varying the persistence and magnitude of the
shock. But in every case we calibrate its impact in a way that the simulated variables match the preliminary data
already available for the first quarter of 2020. Once these simulations are calibrated to match the observed data,
they serve as forecasts of how the relevant variables will behave in the following quarters. Our results are robust and
point to a relatively fast recovery in terms of growth rates. However, the absence of a marked bounce-back effect
implies that the convergence to the steady state will be slow. In other words, our findings suggest a long-standing
process of recovery for the levels of the variables, given that the recession will not be followed by a period of high
growth rates. Our conclusions should nonetheless be taken cautiously, in light of the limitations of the preliminary
data at our reach.
Finally, we assess the efficiency of a policy of quantitative easing, like many central banks are adopting, as a
possible strategy to speed up the economic recovery. We find that, indeed, it mitigates the effects of the lock-down,
at the cost of an increase in prices. Therefore, the dramatic economic fall that we have experienced cannot be
counterbalanced only with quantitative easing measures, because the rise in inflation would exceed the limit set
by the European Central Bank. Hence, these initiatives can be considered for a short-term neutralization of the
recession, but they should be accompanied by additional measures with focus on the medium and long run.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the nature of the pandemic shock that we are
confronting. Section 3 provides a description of the model. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation. Section
5 exposes the findings of the simulation exercise that we carry out in order to approximate the economic effects of
the lock-down. Section 6 includes additional simulations in which we incorporate the quantitative easing programme
to the model. Lastly, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Calibrating the pandemic shock
Figure 1 shows the evolution of some relevant variables in the Euro Area since the beginning of the new millennium
and until the first quarter of 2020, in which the pandemic shock comes into play. It should be noted that there may
be deeper consequences not captured by traditional data, since their computations were not designed to capture
the effects of a lock-down. For instance, education has continued remotely but its costs have remained unchanged,
thus not having impact on its GDP contribution. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the services offered have been
the same. Moreover, the observed data for this first quarter of the year are preliminary and will be revised in the
following months. Even so, they still should offer a notion of how the economy is responding.
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Figure 1
Observed series (2000Q1 - 2020Q1)
Notes. Real variables are expressed as first differences of logarithms. Hours worked in logarithms. Interest rate
and spread in levels. All series are measured in deviations from their sample means. The first period of the
confinement (2020Q1) is marked in red.
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The lock-down has caused dramatic falls in employment and production, similarly as the previous crisis. Con-
sumption, which also drops, makes a notorious difference. We had not seen such sudden stop in the last decades.
In contrast, investment has augmented, although at a lower scale. Furthermore, even though the aggregate salaries
have diminished, the impact has been much softer than on the total hours worked, leading to a considerable increase
in real wages per hour. Oblivious to the unpredictability of the situation, inflation and nominal interest rates remain
relatively stable. In the financial sector, the abrupt take-off in the risk premium reveals the sudden outbreak of
uncertainty.
Most countries in the Euro Area have followed similar measures to face the tragedy. People has been forced
to stay at home for their own safety. The duration has varied across state members, but four months after the
beginning of lock-downs, restrictions have only been relaxed, not lifted yet. As a consequence, labour force has
been largely lessened, although the impact has been unequal for different economic sectors. And still if they had
not imposed any measures, authorities’ decisions might have had limited effects, as highlighted by Moser and Yared
(2020). Even without governmental enforcement, people on their own initiative would reduce consumption and
labour (Baker, Farrokhnia, Meyer, Pagel, and Yannelis, 2020). These voluntary decisions, in spite of contributing
to get the pandemic under control, have a harmful impact on the economy (Eichenbaum et al., 2020).
As unexpected as it has been, COVID-19 is not devoid of precedents. Jorda`, Singh, and Taylor (2020) make
an extensive analysis of past pandemics from the last six centuries. This work discloses a historical growth in real
wages and lower real natural rate during the three or four decades after pandemics.1 But their main finding is
that, unlike wars, pandemics are historically followed by periods with low returns to assets and scarce investment
opportunities. The authors point to the excess of capital for a decimated population and higher reservations to
put wealth into risk as the most likely explanations. This condition might be especially intense this time, due to
the unequal impact of COVID-19. The nature of the virus makes it affect more severely the elderly, who tend to
save more in relative terms. According to Oswald and Powdthavee (2020), age is the determinant factor for fatality
of the disease. The greater acuteness on elderly could explain that countries with low-quality health system but
younger population present lower mortality rates than developed countries, with their advanced sanitary services
but considerably older citizens, on average.
3 The model
In our desire to find a proper characterisation of the Euro Area economy, we will estimate a DSGE model as the
one used in Smets and Wouters (2007) to study the sources of business cycle fluctuations in the United States. In
addition, we introduce a financial sector to control for rigidities in funding, following Gertler and Karadi (2011) and
Gelain and Ilbas (2017). In this section we describe briefly the model. Nonetheless, a more detailed explanation
can be found in the references previously listed.
1As defined in Jorda` et al. (2020), “the real natural rate of interest is the level of real returns on safe assets which equilibrates an
economy’s savings supply and investment demand” (p. 4) without altering prices.
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3.1 Final goods producers
Inspired in Kimball (1995), Smets and Wouters (2007) consider a composite final good. Firms in this sector buy
intermediate goods and combine them, to create the final product that they supply to customers, investors and
the government. As any other firms, they seek to maximise their profits. On the one hand, their earnings come
from sales of this composite good, Yt, at a price Pt. On the other hand, in this process of assembly they need
intermediate goods, which are paid at different prices, Pt(i) for each good i.
max
{Yt,Yt(i)}
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di.
In this problem their range of decision is limited by the following constraint:[∫ 1
0
G
(
Yt(i)
Yt
; εpt
)
di
]
= 1,
where G is a strictly concave and increasing function such that G(1) = 1. As defined in Kimball (1995), it is an
aggregator, which decomposes the final good into the combination of a variety of inputs. The restriction implies
that there are no spillovers in the production process, but also that firms in this sector do not enlarge output, just
re-package it. Hence, it takes one unit of intermediate production to make a unit of retail output. The model also
includes a price mark-up disturbance, εpt , to introduce changes in the elasticity of demand of intermediate goods
and, as a consequence, in the mark-up.
3.2 Intermediate goods producers
In this sector, intermediate goods are produced and sold to final good firms. In their production process they
employ capital and labour. An intermediate firm i produces accordingly to the following technology:
Yt(i) = ε
a
t (K
s
t (i))
α (
γtLt(i)
)1−α − γtΦ,
where Φ is a fixed cost of production and γt is the labour-augmenting deterministic growth rate of the economy.
The shock in this function, εat , represents the total factor productivity.
Firms want to maximise profits, which are given by the difference between the monetary value of output and
the amounts set aside for hiring the production inputs.
max
{Kst (i),Lt(i)}
Πt = Pt(i)Yt(i)−WtLt(i)−RktKst (i).
The model adopts Calvo’s (1983) pricing scheme with partial indexation. At every period, a fraction ξp of firms
is allowed to adjust their prices. Meanwhile, the rest of companies can only update theirs in accordance with an
indexation rule to adapt to variations in prices. In this framework, a company allowed to re-optimise its price will
make its decision taking into account not only the present but also all the forthcoming periods in which it will not
be permitted to adjust again. Thus, the optimisation problem they confront is:
max
{P˜t(i)}
Et
∞∑
s=0
ξsp
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
[
P˜t(i)
(
s∏
l=1
pi
ιp
t+l−1pi
1−ιp∗
)
−MCt+s
]
Yt+s(i),
s.t. Yt+s(i) = Yt+sG
′−1
(
Pt(i)Xt,s
Pt+s
τt+s
)
,
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where P˜t(i) is the newly set price, pit is inflation,
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
is the stochastic discount rate, τt =
∫ 1
0
G′
(
Yt(i)
Yt
)
Yt(i)
Yt
di
and
Xt,s =
1 for s = 0(∏s
l=1 pi
ιp
t+l−1pi
1−ιp∗
)
for s = 1, ...,∞
3.3 Households
Household j consumes Ct(j) and acquire bonds Bt(j). They also supply labour, Lt(j), for which they receive a
compensation Wt(j). Their other sources of funding are bonds previously acquired, payouts Divt(j) from ownership
of firms and transfers Tt(j) from the government. Their decisions are affected by the inertia of previous decisions
through λ, which represents external habit formation.
Households’ preferences are modelled with a non-separable utility function which depends on two factors: con-
sumption of goods and time worked. Families want to maximise the sum of this flow of utilities weighted by a
discount factor and considering an infinite life horizon:
max
{Ct(j),Bt(j),Lt(j)}
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
1− σc (Ct+s(j)− λCt+s−1)
1−σc
]
exp
(
σc − 1
1 + σl
εltLt+s(j)
1+σl
)
.
This objective function only differs from Smets and Wouters (2007) in that we incorporate a shock to labour supply,
εlt. The impulse-response functions shown in Smets and Wouters (2003) make us think that this type of disturbance
can be especially suitable to explain the effects that we are observing in these tumultuous times.
Families decision is restricted by their budget constraint:
Ct+s(j) +
Bt+s(j)
εbtRt+sPt+s
− Tt+s = Bt+s−1(j)
Pt+s
+
Wht+s(j)Lt+s(j)
Pt+s
+
Divt+s(j)
Pt+s
,
where εbt is an exogenous premium on riskier rates over the risk-free rate set by the central bank, or a premium
required by households to hold the bond.
Families are composed by workers and bankers. There is some degree of mobility from one sector to the other,
but the fraction of each type is fixed. A household’s member can enter banking thanks to the dividends obtained
from ownership of firms.
3.4 Financial intermediaries
Below we provide a brief explanation of how financial frictions are implemented. We follow Gertler and Karadi
(2011), in which a more detailed description can be found. This sector consists of bankers acting as financial
intermediaries, who borrow funds from households and lend them to non-financial firms. Their balance sheet is as
follows:
QtSj,t = Nj,t +Bj,t+1,
where Nj,t is the net worth of the banker j at the end of the period, Bj,t+1 are the deposits borrowed from
households, and Sj,t is the amount of claims on non-financial firms that the intermediary holds, whose relative price
is given by Qt.
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The activity is profitable for intermediaries because they obtain from holding their assets higher rates than they
pay to the depositaries. This difference, which is called risk premium, gives room to the formation of bankers’
equity capital. The law of motion of net worth is:
Nj,t+1 = Rk,t+1QtSj,t −Rt+1Bj,t+1 = (Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)QtSj,t +Rt+1Nj,t.
The risk premium is given by Rk,t+1−Rt+1. As long as it is positive, the banker will benefit from channelling more
funds between savers and borrowers.
Let (1 − θ) be the probability that a banker will exit the industry and βi U
c
t+i
Uct
the stochastic discount that the
intermediary applies to earnings at period t+i, being U ct the marginal utility of consumption at period t. Therefore,
a banker aiming at maximising the expected terminal wealth will face the following problem:
max
{Sj,t+i}
Vj,t = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1U
c
t+i+1
U ct
Nj,t+i+1 =
= Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1U
c
t+i+1
U ct
[(Rk,t+i+1 −Rt+i+1)QtSj,t+i +Rt+i+1Nj,t+i] .
To limit the ability of bankers to expand their assets indefinitely by borrowing funds from households, Gertler
and Karadi (2011) introduce a moral hazard/costly enforcement problem: intermediaries can divert a fraction Γt
of available funds to their own households. Despite the fact that they assume this fraction is constant, we will take
it as time-varying, as initially suggested by Bean, Paustian, Pen˜alver, and Taylor (2010) or Dedola, Karadi, and
Lombardo (2013). More precisely, we will take Gelain and Ilbas’ (2017) approach and model it as an exogenous
AR(1) process. Thus, it can be interpreted as a financial shock which reflects variations in how large depositors judge
the probability of bankers diverting resources. Hence, households supply funds on the condition that intermediary’s
potential loss due to diversion exceeds the expected gains:
ΓtQtSj,t ≤ Vj,t.
When this constraint binds, the total amount of assets that the intermediaries can achieve depends on their
equity capital: QtSt = φtNj,t, being φt the ratio of assets to equity, also known as intermediaries’ leverage. Then,
the evolution of net worth can be expressed as:
Nj,t+1 = [(Rk,t+1 −Rt+1)φt +Rt+1]Nj,t.
Finally, the law of motion for Nt lies in the sum of the net worth of old and new bankers, respectively Ne,t and
Nn,t.
Nt = Ne,t +Nn,t +N∗εnwt .
We extend the initial model by introducing εnwt , an exogenous shock to the net worth, which will let us have a closer
monitoring of the actual behaviour of this variable. N∗ is the total net worth at the steady state. Additionally, note
that the net worth of veteran intermediaries corresponds to the capital equity of those bankers from the previous
period that did not change sector.
Ne,t = θ [(Rk,t −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1.
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3.5 Capital goods producers
This sector consists of competitive capital producing firms. They repair capital acquired from intermediate goods
producing firms and also build new capital. Afterwards, both are sold to capital services firms. We assume that
the cost of substituting deteriorated capital with new is unity and that the value of a new capital unit is Qt.
Furthermore, adjustment costs for refurbishing capital are not considered. However, the model does suppose that
there are flow adjustment costs when new capital is built. Profits go to households, as they hold capital producers.
Capital firms want to maximise their profits. Denoting gross capital created by It, net capital created by In,t
such that In,t ≡ It − δ(Ut)ξtKt and Iss the steady state investment, the problem to optimise is:
max
{In,τ}
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βT−τ
U ct+i
U ct
[
(Qτ − 1)In,τ − f
(
In,τ + Iss
In,τ−1 + Iss
)
(In,τ + Iss)
]
,
where f(1) = f ′(1) = 0, f ′′(1) > 0, and δ(Ut)ξtKt is the quantity of capital refurbished.
The stock of capital evolves according to the law of capital accumulation:
Kt(j) = (1− δ)Kt−1(j) + εit
[
1− S
(
It(j)
It−1(j)
)]
It(j),
where δ is the depreciation rate and εit is an exogenous shock to investment relative to consumption goods. Adjust-
ment costs are assumed to be quadratic. They are defined by the function S(It/It−1), which is a strictly increasing
twice differentiable function. It satisfies the properties S(1) = S′(1) = 0, and S′′(1) > 0.
3.6 Capital services firms
Firms in this sector purchase the capital goods offered by capital goods producers. Capital services firms decide
the utilisation rate (Zt), which determines the amount of effective capital available for renting:
Kst = ZtKt−1.
Therefore, the income from renting equals RktZtKt−1. They can vary the level of capital employed, but the change
implies some adjustment costs: a(Zt)Kt−1. Then, the maximisation problem for companies in this sector is:
max
{Zt}
[
RktZt − a(Zt)
]
Kt−1.
Capital services firms borrow from financial intermediaries in order to finance their physical capital acquisition.
And given that each claim is priced the same as a unit of capital, then at equilibrium:
QtKt+1 = QtSt.
3.7 Labour unions and labour packers
In order to introduce rigidities in wages under a Calvo scheme, the model sets up a framework with two intermediaries
between labour supply and labour demand. Initially, households are suppliers of homogeneous labour. It is acquired
by a labour union, which differentiates it. At this stage, intermediate packers use this differentiated labour to create
a package, Lt, to supply intermediate goods producers.
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Labour packers achieve profits from the discrepancy between what intermediate producers pay for their labour
packages and what unions charge for differentiated labour. There is, therefore, a gap between Wt, the wage rate
earned by the packer, and Wt(i), the wage rate of intermediate labour services.
max
{Lt,Lt(i)}
WtLt −
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di.
They face a resources constraint, just like the one in final goods producers’ problem. In this case, the restriction
implies that the intermediate packers supply exactly the same units of labour they hire from unions:[∫ 1
0
H
(
Lt(i)
Lt
; εwt
)
di
]
= 1,
being H is a Kimball aggregator, like the one in the final goods production function, and εwt a shock that affects
the wage mark-up through the elasticity of demand.
At the previous stage, labour unions decide wages a` la Calvo with partial indexation. They can re-optimise
wages with probability ξw. Therefore, those allowed set a wage rate W˜t(i) that optimises not only current but
also future earnings, taking into account the probability not to be able to change salaries again in some time.
Analogously to labour packer’s case, the profits for the union come from the difference between what they earn for
the heterogeneous labour they supply and what they pay to the homogeneous workers they employ.
max
{W˜t(i)}
Et
∞∑
s=0
ξsw
βsΞt+sPt
ΞtPt+s
[
W˜t(i)
(
s∏
l=1
γpiιwt+l−1pi
1−ιw∗ −Wht+s
)]
Lt+s(i).
Additionally, they are subject to a demand constraint that comes from the optimal solution to labour’s packer
problem.
Lt+s(i) = Lt+sH
′ −1
[
Wt(i)X
w
t,s
Wt+s
∫ 1
0
H ′
(
Lt(i)
Lt
)
Lt(i)
Lt
di
]
.
3.8 Government and central bank
The central bank follows a Taylor rule, under which it is committed to control inflation and output gap. Furthermore,
the economic growth, understood as variations in the output gap, is also regulated. Formally,
Rt
R∗
=
(
Rt−1
R∗
)ρ [(
pit
pi∗
)rpi ( Yt
Y ∗t
)ry]1−ρ( Yt/Yt−1
Y ∗t /Y ∗t−1
)r∆y
εrt ,
where R∗ and Y ∗t are, respectively, the steady state nominal rate and natural output. ρ is a parameter that
determines the degree of interest rate smoothing. Finally, a shock to monetary policy, εrt is incorporated.
Regarding the government, it is financed by lump-sum taxes and bonds. These economic resources are destined
to the repayment of previously issued bonds and government spending. In terms relative to the steady state output
path, government spending εgt =
Gt
Y γt is modelled as another exogenous shock. This disturbance also collects the
net-exports effects on aggregate demand, which are ignored in this closed-economy model. Consequently, it can
react to developments in productivity, that affect competitiveness in external markets.
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3.9 Resource constraint
Finally, the whole economy is restricted by the availability of limited resources. Therefore, the production has to
be divided between private consumption and investment, government’s expenditure and capital adjustment costs.
Ct + It +Gt + a(Zt)Kt−1 = Yt.
3.10 Exogenous disturbances
The economy presented above is subject to the influence of ten different perturbations. Seven of them (εat , ε
l
t, ε
b
t ,
εit, Γt, ε
nw
t and ε
r
t ) follow AR(1) processes. Mark-ups on prices and wages, ε
p
t and ε
w
t , are described by ARMA(1,1)
processes. Finally, exogenous spending, εgt , follows an AR(1), augmented with a component that interacts with the
productivity shock. A more detailed explanation for each disturbance is provided in Appendix II.
4 Estimation
At equilibrium, all the agents solve their maximisation problems and all markets clear. Therefore, the first order
conditions derived from each sector hold. We log-linearise these equations to introduce them in Dynare. They can
be consulted in Appendix I.
In our search for the best characterisation of the economy, we do not want to simply calibrate the model to
start our simulations at the observed values of the variables one period before the coronavirus outbreak. Instead
of that, we estimate the model with data for the 20 previous years. More precisely, we use quarterly data for the
Euro Area in the period 2000Q1 - 2019Q4. After the estimation, the model itself is able to bring the economy to
the starting point for the simulations, 2019Q4. Our main data source is Eurostat. Appendix III provides more
information about the time series employed.
For the macroeconomic building block of the model, we use a set of variables for the Euro Area which is equivalent
to the one used in Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US. All real variables are divided between the working age
population, to have them in per capita terms. They are also multiplied by 1000 due to the difference of scale: real
variables are measured in million euro whereas population comes in thousand people. The nominal wage is divided
between the GDP deflator and the labour force, to obtain real wage per hour worked. And, for the same reason as
real variables, we multiply it by 1000. Finally, the interest rate is divided by 4 to adapt it to quarterly return and
by 100 because it comes as a percentage. In this way, we get our set of macroeconomic observables, consisting of
real GDP per capita, real consumption per capita, real investment per capita, real wage per hour worked, nominal
interest rate, hours worked per capita and the GDP deflator.
As we are implementing a financial extension of the model, we include additional financial series. In particular,
we opted for credit spread, as a proxy for the risk premium.2 Gelain and Ilbas (2017) use Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek’s
(2012) spread. However, this measure is constructed for the US. In consequence, we take the version for the Euro
2Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012) shows that credit spread is closely related to financial intermediary balance and therefore is an
adequate proxy for the risk premium.
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Area from Gilchrist and Mojon (2018), which follows the same methodology.3 This decision to use the spread
seems especially appropriate considering the great proportion of corporate debt that is currently rated at the lowest
investment grade rating (Becker et al., 2020).
Finally, we have to take logarithms of the data. Only the interest rate and the spread remain unchanged. As we
are dealing with a relatively small sample period, we demean all the observables instead of estimating their steady
state growth path. The historical value that is subtracted from each variable is shown in Table 1. Additionally,
variables in logarithms are multiplied by 100, to have them in percentage terms.
Table 1
Estimated historical values
Variable dy = ln
(
Yt
Yt−1
)
dc = ln
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
dinve = ln
(
It
It−1
)
pinf = ln
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
Average 0.0029 0.0023 0.0029 0.0039
Variable dw = ln
(
Wt
Wt−1
)
lab = lnLt r Prem
Average 0.0022 5.6262 0.4218 0.3403
We use Bayesian methods for the estimation through Dynare, in Matlab.4 For lack of identifiability, some
parameters need to be fixed in advance, as in Smets and Wouters (2007), and in Gelain and Ilbas (2017). More
precisely, the quarterly depreciation rate, δ; the wage mark-up at the steady state, φw; the share of exogenous
spending in total production, gy; the curvature of the Kimball aggregator in both goods and labour markts, εp and
εw; the proportion of transfers to new bankers, ω; the steady state return to capital, crk; the common trend growth
for the real variables, γ; households’ discount factor, β; the steady state level of the net premium, cs, and the net
worth growth at the steady state, cn. Table 2 contains the values chosen, which are retrieved from the calibrations
and prior assumptions suggested in the related literature.
Table 2
Fixed parameters
δ φw gy εp εw ω crk γ β cs cn
0.025 1.5 0.18 10 10 0.002 1.29 0.4 0.9975 0.48 2.27
3The time series can be downloaded from https://publications.banque-france.fr/en/economic-and-financial-publications-working-
papers/credit-risk-euro-area
4There is an extensive literature addressing Bayesian estimation of DSGE models. See, for instance, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010)
and Guerro´n-Quintana and Nason (2013) to get a clear and deep understanding of this estimation technique.
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Figure 2
Actual vs 1-step ahead forecast series
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The estimation procedure provides standard values for the parameters, broadly in line with those reported in
Smets and Wouters (2003) for the Euro Area and by Smets and Wouters (2007) for the US. These estimates turn
out to be quite robust, even when the model is modified in some way. Thus, the values obtained are similar when
accounting for financial rigidities (Gelain and Ilbas, 2017), for adaptive learning (Slobodyan and Wouters, 2012;
Aguilar and Va´zquez, 2019), or for news shocks (Herrera and Va´zquez, 2020). Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix IV
show the parameter estimates. Moreover, Figure 2 indicates that the Bayesian estimation procedure presents a
good fit between the actual series and the forecasts made one quarter in advance, even if it smooths their high
frequency fluctuations. Therefore, in light of the evidence, we conclude that the estimated model offers a sound
characterisation of the economy in the Euro Area.
5 Simulations
Approximating the reality through the estimation of a DSGE model is not a main goal of this work, but rather a
means to tackle the macroeconomic consequences induced by the shock that confinement has meant. We address
such aim by simulating the five years after the coronavirus outbreak. Hence, the first period simulated is the first
quarter of 2020, which is generated from the levels and trends of the variables until 2019Q4 that we have estimated
in the previous section, but also taking into account the intense economic disruption that the pandemic has entailed.
As previously announced, we use the labour supply shock as the primary exogenous variable in this exercise. In
other words, we assume that the pandemic shock hits the economy in a similar way as a disturbance to the labour
supply, but of a much greater magnitude this time.
We set up our baseline case by assuming that the persistence of this disturbance is the one estimated for the
labour supply shock, ρl = 0.991. Arguably, the lock-down is a very atypical situation which need not be represented
by the labour shock estimated in our model before the pandemic, but it certainly helps as a reference. Moreover,
we carry out a robustness analysis by repeating this exercise for different values of persistence. We obtain two
remarkable outcomes. Interestingly, this value of persistence is the one making the simulation fit best the data
observed in 2020Q1. Besides, the most relevant findings regarding the duration of the recession turn out to be quite
robust.5 Furthermore, we have solid reasons to expect this labour supply disturbance to be highly persistent. First,
many adaptations implemented during the lock-down are likely to stay. For instance, remotely working (Willcocks,
2020), the re-thinking of supply chains (Donthu and Gustafsson, 2020) and, in general, the new organisational
structures derived from the confinement restrictions. Second, in a world considerably interconnected, the economic
consequences in regions being hit by the disease will propagate to other areas, even if they have already overcome
the health crisis (Inoue and Todo, 2020). Third, individuals, firms and the entire society have changed. Our
consumption patterns will probably take a long time before getting back to normal, if they do (Sheth, 2020). Fourth,
these effects can be exacerbated by people’s current negative expectations regarding the recovery (Codagnone et
al., 2020). Finally, the mere threat of new outbreaks disrupts the economy (Chen, Qian, and Wen, 2020).
5We consider the following values for the persistence of the shock: 0.95, 0.90, 0.85 and 0.75, but the recovery of growth rates is
not substantially accelerated or delayed in any of these cases. Values of persistence under 0.75 result in considerable variations in the
reactions of some variables, up to the point of not being consistent with the 2020Q1 observed data available. The impulse-response
functions for a persistence value of 0.90 can be found in Appendix V.
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Figure 3
Simulation results (ρl = 0.991)
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We consider four possible calibrations for the magnitude of the shock, in a way that either the hours worked, the
output growth, the consumption growth or the investment growth simulated roughly matches the actual observation
for the first quarter of 2020. The graphs in Figure 3 show the results of the simulations under these four scenarios.
Given that they only differ in the assumptions regarding the pandemic shock, they overlap until 2019Q4, when the
disease hit our society. Moreover, even after the disruption we observe that the four paths imply similar patterns
for most of the relevant variables. Remarkably, the simulations replicate fairly well the preliminary data for the first
observation of the year, which is represented by a green point. Only prices escape to our approximation. Simulated
inflation is slightly over the actual value. This is likely due to the fact that the economy has been subject to strong
deflationary pressures since the Great Recession. In the case of the nominal interest rate, the model predicts how it
should respond to these stimuli under normal circumstances, but it is not able to seize the actual monetary policy
due to the zero lower bound. With respect to the compensations of employees, the simulation gets right the sign
of the response, but underestimates its magnitude. A possible reason for this finding is that the model does not
account for the heterogeneous impact of the shock across different economic sectors.
While this analysis illustrates the impact of a pandemic shock, the impulse-response functions (IRF) are more
suitable for the analysis of the dynamics after the shock. They show the reaction of the economy to an external
event along a specified time horizon, compared to the steady state situation. Hence, we have to interpret them as
a measure of the deviations that the shock causes, with respect to how the economy was expected to behave at the
steady state. In this case, we focus on a horizon of five years since the worldwide spread of the disease.
Figure 4 contains the IRFs for the pandemic shock, i.e. a highly persistent shock to the supply of labour. They
show the simulated behaviour of the variables in the forthcoming years. Notice the square-root-shaped recovery
forecasted for the growth rate of real production and real consumption. They start with a huge fall and then, at
the beginning of next year, they grow again at steady state rates. The IRFs quickly become flat. Investment,
which follows a similar path, suffers the largest reduction. A plausible explanation is provided by Farmer and
Gabriel (2020): “ as the COVID-19 crisis places even greater strain on the economy and on public finances, it will
be tempting to view greater investment in innovation as a luxury, to be abandoned in favour of addressing more
immediate concerns ” (p. 37). The recovery is also slower but it shows the most pronounced bounce-back effect. In
2022 it reaches growth rates over the steady state, and therefore speeds up the recovery of pre-crisis levels. Labour
is substantially affected and does not start to recover in levels until next year. Concerning real wages, our model
does not predict great variations, as previously discussed. Therefore, it does not capture the striking increase seen
in the first quarter of 2020. We have to wait until more information is available in order to know whether it was a
momentary event due to the initial and stricter measures of confinement or it will persist. The increase in nominal
interest rates forecasted by our model is well over the actual observation. It goes against the long-run decrease
in interest rates after pandemics noticed by Jorda` et al. (2020). The zero lower bound of the Taylor rule that we
considered is probably the cause. Besides, we come from times with unusually low rates, what may have been
important in this case. Regarding inflation, the model predicts a modest and long-lasting increase. In the financial
sector, we observe that bankers will be severely affected for around two years, and that the risk premium will still
take some time to be controlled.
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Figure 4
Impulse-Response functions (ρl = 0.991)
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Figure 5 shows the simulated output and hours worked since the beginning of the century and for the next 50
years. Notice that both series are in levels, not in growth rates. They reveal that, unless there are new exogenous
stimuli or expansionary policies are applied, the economy will take a long time to get back to pre-crisis levels.
Moreover, variables that were over their steady state values before the coronavirus outbreak, like labour, in normal
circumstances will not reach again the same situation. Instead, they will converge to their steady states. Figure
11 in Appendix VI contains the simulated patterns for the rest of time series in levels. The long time that most
variables require to arrive to their steady states reflects the seriousness of the disturbance that this pandemic has
entailed. Our results can be compared to those obtained by Mihailov (2020). They would be situated in his most
severe scenario, which considers the effects of the pandemic as highly persistent. In other scenarios he sets out, the
recovery would be relatively fast, even in levels.
Figure 5
Convergence to steady state after pandemic shock (ρl = 0.991)
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6 Quantitative easing programme
Many central banks around the world are engaging in quantitative easing (QE) interventions in order to mitigate
the effects of the crisis after COVID-19 outbreak (Hartley and Rebucci, 2020). This is a form of unconventional
monetary policy in which central banks seek to increase money supply, usually through large-scale assets purchases.
In the literature, some authors have integrated quantitative easing programmes endogenously in DSGE models.6
We take a simpler approach and model it as an exogenous disturbance, as we are mostly interested in the analysis
of the consequences of an occasional use of this tool to counterbalance the crisis. In other words, we consider these
large-scale assets purchases as a one-off event. This approach does not seem inappropriate: due to the exceptional
nature of the circumstances, we can expect measures of relative size greatly superior to those adopted in any normal
situation.
In the model, firms borrow funds from financial intermediaries. The cost of the operation depends on the financial
situation of bankers, which is considerably worrisome at present. They have little liquidity and, therefore, borrowing
is costly and investment will fall. Against that, the European Central Bank (ECB) is injecting large amounts of
money, thus reducing the costs of borrowing and partly counterbalancing the fall in investment. Nevertheless, all
that liquidity translates into an increase in the aggregate demand and, unavoidably, in inflation. Summarising, this
policy implies a potential trade-off between output recovery and control of prices. In consequence, it cannot be
used at will: the possibilities are limited by ECB’s inflation target.
To introduce quantitative easing policies, we need to come back to the banking sector. In previous sections we
had QtSt = φtNj,t. Now, let us assume that the demand for assets is not only privately intermediated any longer,
but the central bank is also willing to facilitate lending. Thus, just as in Gertler and Karadi (2011):
QtSt = QtSp,t +QtSg,t = φtNj,t +QtSg,t,
where QtSp,t is the amount of assets intermediated via private banks, QtSg,t is the value of governmentally assisted
assets, and QtSt is the total quantity of intermediated assets. Public share of this total amount is given by ψt.
Therefore, QtSg,t = ψtQtSt.
The QE policy consists of periodical injections of liquidity into the economy. It starts with a big intervention
but in the following periods authorities progressively reduce the quantities. As previously announced, we address
the inclusion of this policy with a new exogenous disturbance. The magnitude of the shock dictates the amounts of
money offered, whereas the persistence determines the duration of the intervention. We consider three possibilities:
half-year, one-year and two-year programmes, and we adjust all of them to be compatible with the European
Central Bank’s inflation target. Figure 6 contains the impulse-response functions associated with the QE shock.
Noteworthy, we find a trade-off between control of inflation and output recovery, as expected. The three possibilities
show similar effects. Apparently, the length of the programmes is not as relevant as the amount of money eventually
injected. In view of these graphs, QE could be an adequate response to this emergency, as it indeed mitigates the
effects of the recession, at the cost of a rise in inflation.
6Some examples are Gertler and Karadi (2013), whose model is very similar as the one in Gertler and Karadi (2011), on which our
financial frictions are grounded; and Hohberger, Priftis, and Vogel (2019), who implement an open economy to account for variations
in the exchange rates as a consequence of quantitative easing policies.
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Figure 6
Impulse-Response functions for different quantitative easing programmes
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Figure 7
Post-confinement reactions to a quantitative easing programme (I)
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Figure 8
Post-confinement reactions to a quantitative easing programme (II)
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In order to analyse how effective the QE policy can be under the current circumstances, we repeat the exercise
but now accounting for the shock to the labour supply. We reintroduce the four different calibrations that we set
up in the previous section. This time we only consider the QE programme featured by the intermediate option
of one-year length. We adjust the magnitude of the intervention in order to maximise output recovery without
exceeding ECB’s inflation restrictions. Besides, we assume that these actions are taken from 2020Q2 onwards, i.e.
they start one quarter after the pandemic shock. Figures 7 and 8 show how the economy after confinement will
react when authorities introduce this measure. When compared with the IRFs in Figure 4, they reveal substantial
effects in the short run. Output would immediately change its course, even reaching positive growth. Consumption
is barely affected by the intermediation, but labour does show improvements in the short run. Investment reaches
a positive peak right after the introduction of the policy. Likewise, real wages and nominal interest rate receive
upward pressure. With respect to the financial sector, the measure results in an abrupt reduction of credit costs,
consistent with the remarkable expansion of money supply. Bankers also receive a momentary boost. The raise in
inflation is the cost paid to mitigate the economic damage caused by the pandemic. The calibrations for labour
and consumption growth would imply that the QE plan is within ECB’s inflation target, whereas if eventually the
calibration for output growth turns out to be the most accurate, there would be some free room to increase the
size of these money injections. Under the calibration for investment growth, the programme would be slightly over
ECB’s objective, but it may be affordable under these circumstances.
Nevertheless, when we shift our attention to the long term, we find that the effects of this policy rapidly
vanish. After some years, the simulated time series patterns do not exhibit substantial changes with respect to
the situation with no unconventional monetary policy. The economy would still need an unsatisfactory amount of
time to approach its steady state. It can be clearly observed when comparing Figures 9 and 5. Similar simulated
patterns for the rest of variables can be found in Figure 11, in Appendix VI.
Hence, we can conclude that QE helps mitigating the harmful economic repercussions of the pandemic. However,
for its restoring effects to be durable, the intervention should be strikingly significant or sustained over time. Such
strategy would not be assumable given the current restrictions that the European Central Bank imposes with its
inflation target. In consequence, QE measures can be considered for a momentary offset of the recession, but not
as a long-standing solution. Therefore, they should be accompanied by other actions meeting the medium and
long-run needs that this dramatic event has prompted.
Figure 9
Convergence to steady state after the pandemic shock (ρl = 0.991) and a quantitative easing policy
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7 Conclusions
The worldwide spread of coronavirus took most of us by surprise. Including governments, which were forced
to improvise in their approaches to cope with the pandemic. And against such a transcendental mission as it was
minimising costs in human lives, the economy was somewhat relegated to second place in decision-making processes.
Productive activities were largely frozen and social interactions reduced to a minimum.
In the previous pages we comment on the economic consequences of these measures. We characterise the economy
of the Euro Area with a medium-scale DSGE model. In order to replicate the impact of confinement, we make use of
an exogenous disturbance to the supply of labour of stunning magnitude. Relying on the results of the estimation,
and including this unexpected pandemic shock, we carry out several simulations in which we account for different
possible calibrations. We find out that they all point to a relatively fast recovery in growth rates. However, the
bounce-back effect is too small. Therefore, without unusually high growth rates in the following years, the levels of
the economic variables are condemned to a long-lasting process of convergence to their steady state values.
These predictions give room for the adoption of new extraordinary measures to counterbalance those adopted
in the previous months. Many central banks are opting for quantitative easing initiatives. We adapt the model for
that possibility with a new exogenous disturbance hitting the market for assets, thus allowing authorities to inject
additional funds into the economy. We simulate the effects that such intervention can have in the economy within
the framework of our model. Unfortunately, this policy implies a trade-off between control of inflation and output
recovery, and therefore its use is restricted by central banks’ inflation targets.
We carry out a simulation exercise in which, keeping the pandemic shock, we calibrate a possible one-year
quantitative easing programme in such a way that it maximises output recovery without exceeding European
Central Bank’s objectives of inflation. In light of our results, we conclude that quantitative easing helps mitigating
the harmful economic repercussions of the stop in production activities imposed during the confinement. However,
these restoring effects are ephemeral. Quantitative easing measures are adequate for an immediate neutralization
of the recession, but they should not be seen as a silver bullet for the recovery. Unless they are accompanied by
additional measures with focus on the medium and long run, the economy will not be able to get back to pre-crisis
levels in a reasonable amount of time.
It should be noticed that our results are based on a single shock. Even though we assume it will be highly
persistent, new outbreaks and measures of confinement may alter their accuracy. Besides, we only have one period
of data available since the pandemic, 2020Q1. This may translate into a poor calibration of the shock. When new
observations appear and the preliminary ones are revised, we will be able to improve the calibration and, therefore,
the reliability of the simulation pattern. It could even be necessary to incorporate other perturbations together
with the labour supply disturbance in order to emulate properly the repercussions of confinement. It would be
interesting to repeat the analysis in other economic areas, for the sake of robustness. Moreover, the model could
be further developed with the inclusion of heterogeneous agents, in order to account for the rise in inequality that
the shock is causing due to its irregular impact across different economic sectors. Still, we hope that this work will
provide a general insight of the economic situation after the pandemic and that it will serve as a basis for deeper
research within the framework of DSGE modelling.
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Appendices
Appendix I log-linearised model
At equilibrium, all agents behave optimally and all markets clear. Under these assumptions, the economy is
characterised by the first-order conditions derived from the maximisation problems. There is one additional step
needed before out the estimation through Bayesian methods: we have to log-linearise these conditions. In this
section we show the resulting log-linearised equations, which we finally introduce into Dynare. In general, they are
the same as in Gelain and Ilbas (2017), with a few modifications.
From households’ decision we obtain the following Euler equation:
ct =
λ/γ
1 + λ/γ
ct−1 +
1
1 + λ/γ
Etct+1 +
(σc − 1)
(
Wh∗ L∗/C∗
)
σc (1 + λ/γ)
(lt − Etlt+1)− 1−
λ/γ
σc (1 + λ/γ)
(
rt − Etpit+1 + εbt
)
,
being γ the steady state growth rate, σc the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, λ a habit parameter and
(rt − Etpit+1) the ex-ante real interest rate. ct and lt are the first log-differences of consumption and labour at
period t, whereas pit is inflation and rt the nominal interest rate. ε
b
t is an exogenous disturbance related to the
difference between the interest rate and the return on assets that households request. Parameters with subindex ∗
represent the steady state values of their respective variables.
From labour unions’ problem we derive the wage setting equation:
wt =
1
1 + β¯
wt−1 +
β¯
1 + β¯
(Etwt+1 + Etpit+1)− 1 + β¯ιw
1 + β¯
pit +
ιw
1 + β¯
pit−1 −
(
1− β¯ξw
)
(1− ξw)(
1 + β¯
)
ξw [(φw − 1)εw + 1]
µwt + ε
w
t ,
where β¯ = βγ1−σc , being β the households’ discount factor. ξw is the Calvo-probability that the union can change
wages at a given time. Wages that cannot be re-optimised are partially indexed to the past inflation rate through
ιw. εw represents the curvature of the Kimball aggregator for the labour market and (φw−1) is a constant mark-up
in this market.
µwt is the wage mark-up, given by:
µwt = wt −mrst = wt −
[
σl(ε
l
t + lt) +
1
1− λ (ct − λct−1)
]
,
i.e. by the difference between the real wage in first log-differences (wt) and the marginal rate of substitution between
labour and consumption. σl is the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage. Two shocks intervene
here. On the one hand a wage mark-up shock, εwt . On the other hand, ε
l
t is the perturbation in the supply of
labour, which we use to approximate the effects of confinement.
Additionally, the log-linear investment (it) is retrieved from its own Euler equation:
it =
1
1 + β¯
it−1 +
β¯
1 + β¯
Etit+1 +
1
(1 + β¯)γ2ϕ
qt + ε
i
t,
where ϕ is the elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function at the steady state and εit the investment-specific
technology shock. qt is the real value of capital, which can be derived from:
retkt =
Rk∗
Rk∗ + 1− δ
rkt +
1− δ
Rk∗ + 1− δ
qt − qt−1 − εbt−1,
28
being δ and rkt the capital depreciation rate and rental rate, respectively. ret
k
t is the gross return to capital. k
s
t is a
measure of capital services used in production, which depends on the utilisation rate of capital (zt) and on capital
installed in the previous period: kst = kt−1 +zt. At the same time, the capital utilisation rate is given by: zt =
1−ψ
ψ ,
with ψ a positive function of the elasticity of the capital utilisation adjustment costs.
The law of accumulation of capital is:
kt =
1− δ
γ
kt−1 +
γ − 1 + δ
γ
it +
(
1− 1− δ
γ
)
(1 + β¯)γ2ϕεit.
The New-Keynesian Phillips curve comes from intermediate goods producers problem:
pit =
β¯ιp
1 + β¯ιp
pit−1 +
1
1 + β¯ιp
Etpit+1 −
(
1− β¯ξp
)
(1− ξp)(
1 + β¯ιp
)
ξp [(φp − 1)εp + 1]
µpt + ε
p
t ,
where ιp is the indexation parameter, ξp the Calvo-probability that a firm is allowed to re-optimise prices at a given
period, εp the curvature of the Kimball aggregator for the goods market and (φp − 1) the constant mark-up in this
market. εpt is the price mark-up shock.
µpt is the price mark-up, determined by the difference between the marginal product of labour and the real wage:
µpt = mpltwt = α(k
s
t − lt) + εat − wt,
where εat is the total factor productivity, modelled as an exogenous perturbation.
And from the minimisation of costs, the rental rate of capital is defined as:
rkt = wt + lt − kst .
Equilibrium in the goods market implies that only what is produced can be consumed, with different possible
end uses. Then, this restriction can be divided in two equations. Firstly, on the production side,
yt = φp [αk
s
t + (1− α)lt + εat ] .
Secondly, on the allocation side,
yt = cyct + iyit + zyzt + gyε
g
t .
yt is the first log-differences of aggregate output; cy, iy, zy and gy are the shares of output that the different forms
of consumption represent at the steady state. Exogenous spending comprises other uses for the production, mainly
government’s resources and international trade. It is modelled as an exogenous shock.
The central bank decides its conventional monetary policy following a Taylor rule:
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) [rpipit + ry(yt − ypt )] + r∆y
[
(yt − ypt )− (yt−1 − ypt−1)
]
+ εrt ,
where εrt is a monetary policy shock and (yt − ypt ) is the output gap. For its computation, we assume that the
potential output, ypt is the one achieved in an economy without rigidities.
The log-linearised balance sheet of financial intermediaries is:
qt + st = nSnt + bSbt,
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being st the amount of long-term financial claims that the banker owns, nt represents intermediaries’ equity capital
and bt the short-term deposits from families. Finally, nS = N∗/S∗ and bS = B∗/S∗.
Arbitrage implies that the value of capital acquired by firms and the value of claims against such capital are the
same:
qt + kt = qt + st.
Additionally, the real gross return is given by a Fisher equation:
rrt = rt − Etpit+1 + εbt .
Intermediaries’ leverage (levt) is given by:
levt = ηt − Γ∗
Γ∗ − υ∗Γt −
υ∗
Γ∗ − υ∗ υt,
where Γt is the fraction of funds that the intermediary may divert at a given time, which is taken as an exogenous
disturbance. ηt represents the expected value of future net worth and υt the expected gains for the intermediaries
from expanding assets. They are respectively described by:
ηt =
β(1− θ)RR∗
γσcη∗
(
EtU
c
t+1 − U ct + rrt
)
+
β
γσc
θZGK∗ Et
(
U ct+1 − U ct + zGKt,t+1 + ηt+1
)
,
υt =
β(1− θ)
γσcυ∗
[(
ret
k
∗Etret
k
t+1 −RR∗rrt
)
+
(
ret
k
∗ −RR∗
)
(EtU
c
t+1 − U ct )
]
+
β
γσc
θX∗Et
(
U ct+1 − U ct + xt,t+1 + υt+1
)
,
where θ is the fraction of bankers that remain in the sector, zGKt,t+1 is the gross growth rate of net worth, xt,t+1 is
the gross growth rate in assets between periods t and t + 1, and U ct is marginal utility of consumption. They are
characterised by the equations:
zGKt−1,t =
lev∗
ZGK∗
(
ret
k
∗ret
k
t −RR∗rrt−1
)
+
lev∗
(
ret
k
∗ −RR∗
)
ZGK∗
levt−1 +
RR∗
ZGK∗
rrt−1,
xt−1,t = levt − levt−1 + zGKt−1,t,
U ct = (σc − 1)L1+σl∗ (εlt + lt)−
σc
1− λct +
σcλ
γ(1− λ)ct−1.
The relation between depositors and bankers is limited by an agency problem:
qt + k
s
t = levt + nt.
In Section 6, where we analyse the consequences of implementing a quantitative easing programme, we transform
the previous condition into:
qt + k
s
t = levt + nt + ε
qe
t .
where εqet is an exogenous disturbance that we introduce to emulate the adoption of this kind of unconventional
monetary policy.
Bankers’ net worth is the sum of existing intermediaries net worth (ne,t) and entering bankers net worth (nn,t):
nt =
NE∗
N∗
ne,t +
NN∗
N∗
nn,t + ε
nw
t ,
30
where εnwt is an exogenous disturbance to net worth that we introduce. And since a proportion θ of bankers remain
in the financial activities, their equity capital is given by: ne,t = z
GK
t−1,t + nt−1.
Households transfer an amount of money to their new bankers, proportional to the funds from exiting bankers,
leading to:
nn,t = qt + k
s
t .
Finally, bankers’ profits come from the premium they earn on their assets:
Premt = Etret
k
t+1.
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Appendix II exogenous disturbances
The economy we have presented is exogenously influenced by several shocks. Below, a brief summary of their
purpose and how they are modelled:
(i) Price mark-up shock (εpt ). It affects the gap between the average price and the nominal marginal cost. It is
described by an exogenous ARMA(1,1) structure: εpt = ρpε
p
t−1 + η
p
t − µpηpt−1.
(ii) Total factor productivity (εat ). It represents variations in technology and affects directly output and the price
mark-up. It follows an exogenous AR(1) process: εat = ρaε
a
t−1 + η
a
t .
(iii) Labour supply shock (εlt). It reflects changes in preferences on labour and leisure. It is the one we use
to approximate the economic effects of COVID-19 confinement. This disturbance is characterised by an
exogenous AR(1): εlt = ρlε
l
t−1 + η
l
t.
(iv) Risk premium shock (εbt). This exogenous disturbance captures the wedge between the interest rate set by the
central bank and the return on assets that households require. It is modelled through an exogenous AR(1)
process: εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + η
b
t .
(v) Investment shock (εit). It affects directly investment and capital accumulation. It also follows an exogenous
AR(1): εit = ρiε
i
t−1 + η
i
t.
(vi) Financial shock (Γt). It represents depositors’ beliefs about the extent to which they will be able to recover
their investment. The structure of this shock is an exogenous AR(1): Γt = ρΓΓt−1 + ηΓt
(vii) Net worth shock (εnwt ). Another disturbance in the financial sector, in this case affecting bankers’ equity. It
is defined by an exogenous AR(1): εnwt = ρnwε
nw
t−1 + η
nw
t .
(viii) Wage mark-up shock (εwt ). It reflects hits to the difference between the real wage and the marginal rate of
substitution. Its characteristic equation is an exogenous ARMA(1,1): εwt = ρwε
w
t−1 + η
w
t − µwηwt−1.
(ix) Monetary policy shock (εrt ). It captures variations in monetary policy and in its effectiveness, following an
exogenous AR(1) process: εrt = ρRε
r
t−1 + η
r
t .
(x) Exogenous spending (εgt ). It accounts for alterations in government’s policies and for international trade,
which can be impulsed by technological shocks. By including the productivity innovation, it captures the
effects of variations in technology for competitiveness in an open economy. It is characterised by the process:
εgt = ρgε
g
t−1 + η
g
t + ρg,aη
a
t .
(xi) Quantitative easing programme (εqet ). We only use it for our final assessment of the effects of a quantitative
easing initiative. It follows an exogenous AR(1) process: εqet = ρqeε
qe
t−1 + η
qe
t
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Appendix III database
As already mentioned, our set of macroeconomic variables is the equivalent for the Euro Area of the one used by
Smets and Wouters (2007). More precisely, we made use of the following series:
 Real GDP: chain linked volumes with base in 2010, seasonally and calendar adjusted and measured in million
euro. Series code: Q.CLV10 MEUR.SCA.B1GQ.EA19.
 GDP deflator: price index with base in 2010. It is already seasonally and calendar adjusted. We will use it
as a measure of inflation. Series code: Q.PD10 EUR.SCA.B1GQ.EA19.
 Real consumption: chain linked volumes with base in 2010, seasonally and calendar adjusted and measured
in million euro. Series code: Q.CLV10 MEUR.SCA.P31 S14 S15.EA19.
 Real investment: chain linked volumes with base in 2010, seasonally and calendar adjusted and measured in
million euro. Series code: Q.CLV10 MEUR.SCA.P51G.EA19.
 Wages: at current prices, seasonally and calendar adjusted and measured in million euro. Series code:
Q.CLV10 MEUR.SCA.P51G.EA19.
 Hours worked: seasonally and calendar adjusted. It encompasses all activities in the economy. Measured in
thousand hours worked. Series code: Q.THS HW.TOTAL.SCA.EMP DC.EA19.
 Nominal interest: 3 month rate. Series code: Q.IRT M3.EA.
 Population: measured in thousand people aged between 15 and 64, to work with the size of the labour force.
Series code: Q.THS.T.TOTAL.Y1564.POP.EA19.
All the series correspond to the aggregate of the 19 current members in the Euro Area, even before they gained
admission into it.7 The sole exception is the interest rate. In this case, we are using the rate applied in the Euro
Area, whatever its composition at each specific time. Given that population series start in 2003, we rely on Brand
and Toulemond’s (2015) approach. They join the separated population series up to 2003 for the current members
of the Euro Area and afterwards they append this combination to the recent data. Eventually, they apply the
Hodrick-Prescott filter to smooth the series.
In the characterisation of the financial expansion, initially we considered to incorporate the variables net worth
and credit spread, just as in Gelain and Ilbas (2017). However, eventually we could only use the latter. Unfor-
tunately, we did not find any suitable net worth time series dating back to year 2000. Among others, we used
Eurostat’s measure for total assets/liabilities in their financial balance sheets (series code: nasq 10 f bs) and
other similar series from the European Central Bank. Consequently we opted for letting the model itself estimate
the net worth without using an observable measure for it.
7The composition of the Euro Area has not been constant over this time. There were 11 countries when it was created, and the other
8 have gained entry along these two decades. The series we use include all the 19 countries during the whole sample period, as if in
year 2000 the Euro Area were already composed by all of them. Otherwise, our results would be affected by changes in the composition
of the monetary union.
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Appendix IV estimation output
Table 3
Estimation output: parameters
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean 5% 95%
ρa Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9706 0.9689 0.9488 0.9893
ρb Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9792 0.9747 0.9598 0.9902
ρg Beta 0.50 0.20 0.8105 0.8148 0.7244 0.9082
ρi Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9290 0.9250 0.9093 0.9415
ρR Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1144 0.2295 0.0100 0.5007
ρΓ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9506 0.6346 0.4258 0.8328
ρl Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9956 0.9910 0.9829 0.9988
ρnw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.4709 0.9558 0.9350 0.9928
ρp Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1347 0.1646 0.0255 0.3005
ρw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1289 0.1643 0.0257 0.2930
µp Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1311 0.1815 0.0219 0.3322
µw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.1287 0.1806 0.0244 0.3297
ϕ Normal 4.00 1.50 4.0788 3.6344 1.6384 5.6477
λ Beta 0.70 0.10 0.4744 0.4561 0.3721 0.5415
ξw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.9190 0.9089 0.8771 0.9413
σl Normal 2.00 0.50 2.4968 2.4927 1.8366 3.1599
ξp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.8945 0.8714 0.8100 0.9322
ιw Beta 0.50 0.15 0.2261 0.2523 0.1094 0.3915
ιp Beta 0.50 0.15 0.1846 0.1810 0.0625 0.2916
ψ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.8705 0.8601 0.7894 0.9314
Φ Normal 1.25 0.13 1.6988 1.7098 1.5628 1.8541
rpi Normal 1.50 0.25 1.4096 1.5138 1.1070 1.8995
ρr Beta 0.75 0.10 0.9142 0.9117 0.8702 0.9550
ry Normal 0.13 0.05 0.1196 0.1061 0.0282 0.1797
r∆y Normal 0.13 0.05 0.2417 0.2500 0.1992 0.2998
ρg,a Normal 0.50 0.25 0.4777 0.4917 0.2371 0.7494
α Normal 0.30 0.05 0.1679 0.1739 0.1327 0.2127
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Table 4
Estimation output: standard deviation of shocks
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean 5% 95%
σa Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.2364 0.2412 0.2073 0.2750
σb Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.0285 0.0298 0.0221 0.0373
σg Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.3618 0.3704 0.3199 0.4190
σi Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.7034 0.7832 0.5540 1.0126
σm Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.0571 0.0542 0.0273 0.0770
σp Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.1286 0.1257 0.1015 0.1503
σw Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.1019 0.0999 0.0808 0.1191
σΓ Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.7784 0.0766 0.0247 0.1085
σl Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.6534 0.6935 0.4955 0.8831
σnw Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.0453 0.0617 0.0450 0.0783
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Appendix V robustness figures
Figure 10
Impulse-Response functions (persistence 0.9)
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Appendix VI convergence to steady state
Figure 11
Convergence to steady state after pandemic shock (ρl = 0.991)
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Figure 12
Convergence to steady state after pandemic shock (ρl = 0.991) and a quantitative easing policy
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